the wants and circumstances that have a streen. Sovereignty has its duties as well as its rights, and none of these local goveraments, even if administered with more regert to the just demands of other nations than they have been, would be permitted, in a spirit of Eastern would be permitted, in a spirit of Eastern woulding, to close the gates of intercourse on the great billburys of the world, and justly the act by the p etension that these avenues of trade and travel belong to them and that they choose to shut them, or, what is almost equivalent, to encumber them with such unjust relations as would prevent their general use.

The principle thus enunciated by Secretary Cass was sound then, and it is sound now. The United States has taken the position that no other government is to build the canal. In 1859, when France proposed to come to the aid of the rrench Panama Company by guaranteeing their bonds, the Senate of the United States in executive session, with only some three votes dissenting, passed a

ome three votes dissenting, passed

resolution, as follows:
That the government of the United States will look with serious concern and deapproval upon any connection of any European government with the construction of any serious control of any ship cannot across the 1sthmus of Darien or across Central America, and runst regard cany suc, connection or control as injurious to the Just rights and intenses of the United States and as a menace to their weitare.

Eagerly Demanded. Eagerly Demanded.

That the canal itself was eagerly demanded by the people of the locality through which it was to pass, and that the people of this locality no less eagerly longed for its construction under American control, are shown by the unanimity of action in the new Pana.

Republic, Furthermore, Colombia, atter having rejected the treaty in spite of our protests and warnings when it was in her protests and warnings when it was in I protests and warnings when it was in her power to accept it, has since shown the utmost eagerness to accept the same treaty if only the status quo could be restored. One of the men standing highest in the official circles of Columbia, on November 6th, addressed the American minister at Bogota, saying that if the government of the United States would be a server to preserve Colombian say. November 6th, addressed the American minister at Bogota, saying that if the government of the United States would land troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty and the transit, the Columbian government would "declare martial law; and, by virtue of vested constitutional authority, when public order is disturbed, (would) approve by decree the ratification of the canal treaty as signed; or, if the government of the United States prefers, (would) call extra session of the Congress—with new and friendly members—next May to approve the treaty." Having these facts in view, there is no shadow of question that the government of the United States preposed a treaty which was not merely just, but generous to Colombia, which our peorle regarded as erring, if at all, on the side of overgenerosity; which was hailed with delight by the people of the immediate locality through which the canal was to pass, who were most concerned as to the new order of things, and which the Colombian authorities now recegnize as being so good that they are willing to promise its unconditional ratificia-

equal terms. The United States thus assumed the position of guarantor of the canni and of its peaceful use by all the world. The guaranty included, as a matter of course, the building of the canni. The enterprise was recognized as responding to an international need, and it would be the veriest travesty on right and justice to treat the governments in possession of the isthmurs having the right, in the language of Mr. Cass, "to close the gates of intercourse on the great highways of the world, and justify the net by the pretension that these avenues of trade and travel belong to them, and that they choose to shut them."

When this government submitted to Colombia the Hay-Herran treaty three things were, therefore, already sattled.

The time for delay, the time for permitting the attempt to be made by private enterprise, the time for permitting any government of anti-social spirit and of imperfect development to bar the work, was past. The United States had assumed in connection with the canal certain responsibilities, not only to its own people, but to the civilized world, which imperatively demanded that there should no longer be delay in beginning the work. Second. While it was settled that the Canal should be built without unnecessary or improper delay, it was no less clearly shown to be our purpose to deal not merely in a spirit or justice, but in a spirit of generality, with the people through whose land we might built it. The ring-lierran treaty, if it erred at all, erred in the direction of an over-generally towards the Colombian Government. In our anxiety to be fair we had gone to the very verge in yielding to a wear nation a demands what that nation was helplessly unable to enforce from us against our will. The only criticisms made upon the administration for the terms of the Haysherman treaty were for having granted too much to Colombian not for failure to grant teaugh. Neather marks was interpretable of the that this treaty was formulated, was there complaint that it did not in the fullest and ampliest manner guarantees to Colombian everything that she could by any color of title demand.

Not is the fact to be lost sight of that

conformity with the express require June 28, 1902. By that act, as heretofore





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readed as principle if all all on the disease with the short of the construction of the control of the control

of the Colombian Congress.

A-second alternative was that by the close of the session on the last day of Cetober, without the ratification of the treaty by Colombia and without any steps taken by Panama, the American Congress, on assembling early in November, wou'd be confronted with a situation in which there had been a failure to come to terms as to building the canaling the Panama route, and yet there had not been a lapse of a reasonable time—using the word reasonable in any proper sense—such as would justify the administration going to the Nicaragua route. This situation seemed on the whole the most likely, and, as a matter of fact, I had made the ornigal draft of my message to the Congress with a view to its existence.

It was the opinion of eminent international jurists that in view of the fact that the great design of our guarantee under the treaty of 1846 was to dedicate the Isthmus to the purposes of intercenalic transit and, above all, to secure the construction of an interoceanic canal committee outlered to under existing

construction of an interoceanic a', Colombia could not, under existing ditions, refuse to enter into a proper angement with the United States to it end without violating the spirit I substantially repudiating the obliga-ne of a treaty, the full benefits of cicl sine had enjoyed for over fifty tions of a treaty, the full benefits of which she had enjoyed for over fifty years. My intention was to consult the Corgress as to whether, under such circumstances, it would not be proper to announce that the canal was to be dug forthwith; that we would give the tirms that we had offered and no circus; and that, if such terms were not agreed to, we would enter into an arrangement with Panama direct, or take what other steps were needful in order to begin the enterprise.

A third possibility was that the people of the fathmus, who had formerly constituted an independent state, and who, until recently, were unlied to Columbia only by a loose the of federal relationship, might take the protection of their own vital interests into their own hands, reassert their independence upon just grounds, and establish a government on their canal willing to do the

declare their independence upon just grounds, and extability a government composition and willing to do its share in this great work for civilization. This third possibility is what actually occurred. Every one knew that it was a nessibility, but it was not until towards the end of October that it appeared to be an imminent probability. Although the administration of course, had special incessary in order to appreciate the possibility, and toward the end the likelihood, of such a revolutionary outbreak

and of its success. It was a matter of common notoriety. Quotations from the distribution of the washington lost and some of the washington lost and some of the Washington Dost and State Office of the New York papers to show that there was a matter of the New York papers to show that there was a matter of the New York papers to show that there was a matter of the Washington Dost and the Washington Dost and Do to Eleutehant-Geachi to his memorandum— That while on the Istmus they became

by the content of the

and the year before that. The first two telegrams are from the Department of State to the consul at Panama:

State to the consul at Panama:

July 25, 1900.

You are directed to protest against any act of hostility which may involve or imperfit the safe and penceful transit of learning or property across the Islamus of Fanama. The bombardment of Panama would have this effect, and the United States must insist upon the neutrality of the isthmus, as guaranteed by the treaty.

Notify all parties molesting or interfering with free transit across the istimus that such interference must cause

fering with free transit across the istimus that such interference must cease and that such interference must cease and that the United States will prevent the interruption of traffic upon the religion. Consult with captain of the lowar who will be instructed to land marines, if necessary, for the protection of the railroad, in accordance with the treaty rights and obligations of the United States. Desirable to avoid bloodshed, if toosable.

The next three telegrams are from and to the Secretary of the Navy:

The next three telegrams are from and to the Secretary of the Navy:

September 12, 1902.

Itanger, Panama:

United States guarantees perfect neutrality or latinus and that a free transit from to sea to sea not interrupted or embarrassed. * * Any transportation of troops which might contravene these provisions of treaty should not be suctioned by you, nor should use of road to permitted which might convert the Lie of transit into thester of hostility.

Colon, Septembor 29, 1902.

Secretary Navy, Washington:

Everything is conceded. The United States gy/rds and guarantees traffic and the line of transit. To-day I permitted the sealing of Colombian troops from ransima to Colon, about 1,000 men each way, the troops without arms in train guarded by American naval force in the same nanner as other passetgers; arms and ammantion in separate train, guarded also by naval force in the same manner as other passetgers; arms and ammantion in separate train, guarded also by naval force in the same manner as other passetgers; arms and ammantion in separate train, guarded also by naval force in the same manner as other passetgers; arms and sent this communication to the American consul at Panama;

"Inform Governor while trains running under United States protection I must ceeling fransportation any combatants, ammunition, arms, which might cause

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lie prepared the following cablegram to the consul-sceneral at Panama and the consul at Colon:

Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly and fully informed. Before this tolegram was sent, however, one was received from Consul Maimros, at Colon, running as follows:

Revolution Imminent. Government force on the Isthmus about 560 men. Their official promised support revolution. Fire department, Panama, 441, are well organized, and 'Invor revolution. Government vessel, Cartagena, with about 560 men, arrivea, carity to-day with new commander-in-chef. Totar. Was not expected until November 10. Tobar's arrival is not probable to stop revolution. This cablegram was received at 2:33 °C. M., and at 3:40 °P. M. Mr. Loomis sent the telegram, which he had already prepared, to both Panama and Colon. Apparently, however, the consul-general at Fanama had not received the information embodied in the Associated Press bulletin, upon which the Associated Press bulletin, upon which the Assistant Secretary of State based his dispatch; for his answer was that there was no uprising, although the situation was critical, this answer being received at \$150 °P. M. immediately afterwards he sent another dispatch, which was received at \$950 °P. M., saying that the uprising had occurred, and had been successful, with no bloodshed. The Colombian guinbant Bogota.

states the willingness of the Fahitim people to fight the Colombian troops and the refusal of Commander, Hubbard to permit them to use the railroad, and therefore, to get into a position where the fight could take place, it thus clearly the fight could take place. It thus clearly appears that the fact that there was no bloodshed on the Isthmus was directly due—and only due—to the prompt and firm enforcement by the United States of its traditional policy. During the past forty years revolutions and attempts at revolution have succeeded but another with monotonous regularity on the Isthmus, and again and signin United States sallers and marines have been landed as they were landed in this instance and under similar instructions to protect the transit. One of these revolulanded as they were landed in this instance and under similar instructions to protect the transit. One of these revolutions resulted in three years of warfare; and the aggregate of bloodshe and misery caused by them has been incalculable. The fact that in this last revolution not a life was lost, save that of the man killed by the shells of the Colombian gunboat, and no property destroyed, was due to los action which I have described. We, in effect, policed the Isthmus in the interest of its inhabituats and of our own national deeds, and for the good of the entire civilized world. Failure to act as the administration acted would have meant great waste of life, great suffering, great destruction of property; all of which was avoided by the firmners and prudence with which Commander Hubbard carried out his orders and pravented either party from attacking the other, Our action was for peace, both of Colombia and of Panama. It is earnestly to be hoped that there will be no unwise conduct on our part which may encourage Colombia to embark on a war which cannot result in her regaining control of the Isthmus, but which may cause much bloodshed and suffering. Injurious Insinuations.

Injurious Insinuations.

I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which have been made of complicity by this government in the revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as destitute of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons might mistake for acquiescence the silence of mero self-respect. I think proper to say, therefore, that no one consected with this government had any part in preparing, inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the Isthmus of Panama, and that save from the re-

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more serious results are sure to follow; Bright's disease, which is the worst form of kidney trouble, may steal upon you.

The mild and the extraordinary effect of the world-famous kidney and bladder remedy, Dr. Kilmer's Swamp-Root, is soon wonderful cures of the most distressing cases. A trial will convince anyone—and you may have a sample bottle free, by mail. realized. It stands the highest for its

Gentlemen—I attribute my present good health to Swamp-Root. I suffered many years with kidney trouble and had an almost constant pain in my back. Your great remedy, Swamp-Root, cured my trouble, and I have since been perfectly well. Yours truly, B. H. Chalker, Chief of Polico,, Ozark, Ala.

an almost constant pain in my back. Your great remety, Swamp-Root, cured my trouble, and i have since been perfectly well. Yours truly,

B. H. Chalker, Chief of Police,
Ozark, Ala.

Lame back is only one symptom of kidney trouble—one of many. Other symptoms showing that you need Swamp-Root are, being obliged to pass water often diring the day and to get up many times during the night, inability to hold your ritine, smarting or irritation in passing brick-dust or sediment in the urine, catarrh of the bladder, uric acid, constant headache, dizziness, sleeplessness, nervousness, irregular heart-beating, rheumatism, bloating, irritability worn-out

need immediate attention, In taking Swamp-Root you afford nat-ural help to Nature, for Swamp-Root is the most perfect healer and gentle aid to the kidneys that is known to medical

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clared themselves an independent repub-lic. Their recognition by this government was based upon a state of facts in no way dependent for its justification upon our action in ordinary cases. I have not denied, nor do I wish to deny, either the validity or the propriety of the general rule that a new State should not be re-cognized as independent till it has shown its ability to maintain its independence. This rule is derived from the principle of non-intervention and as a coraliary of non-intervention, and as a corallary of that principle has generally been observed by the United States. But, like the principle from which it is deduced, the rule is subject to exceptions; and there are in my opinion clear and im-perative reasons why a departure from it was justified and even required in the

was justified and even required in the present instance. These reasons embrace, first, our treaty rights; second, our national interests and safety; and, third, the interests of collective civilization.

I have already adverted to the treaty of 1840, by the thirty-fifth article of which the United States secured the right to a free and open transit across the Isthmus of Panama, and to that end agreed to guarantee to New Granada her rights of sovereignty and property over that territory. This article is some³ over that territory. This article is some times discussed as if the latter guarantee constituted its sole object and bound the United brates to protect the soverthe United States to protect the sovereighty of Now dranada against domestic revolution. Nothing, however, could
be more erroneous than this supposition.
That our wise and patriotic ancestors,
with all their dread of entagling alliances, would have entered into a treaty
with New Granada solely or even primarily for the purpose of enabling that
remnant of the original Republic of
Colombia, then resolved into the States
of New Granada, Venezuela, and Ecuador, to continue from Bogota to rule over colombia, then resolved into the States of New Granada, Venezuela, and Ecuador, to continue from Bogota to rule over the Isthmus of Panama, is a conception that would in itself be incredible, even if the contrary did not clearly appear. It is true that since the treaty was made the United States has again and again been obliged forcibly to intervene for the preservation of rider, and the maintenance of an again treasure.

ports of our military and naval officers, give nabove, no one conected with this government had any previous knowledge of the revolution, except such as was accessible to any person of ordinary intelligence who read the newspayers and kept up a current acquaintance with public affairs.

By the unanimous action of its people, without the firing of a shot-with a unanimity hardly before recorded in any similar case—the people of Panama declared themselves an independent republic. Their recognition by this government the consummation of which would be found in an interoceanic canal. To the accomplishment of this object the government of the United States had for years directed its diplamacy. It occupied a place in the instructions to our delegates to the Panama Congress during the administration of John Quincy Adams. It formed the subject of a resolution of the Senate in 1835, and of the House of Representatives in 1835. In 1846 it is importance had become still more appropriate by reason of the Mexican wurder in the treaty of 1846 did not in terms it bind New Granada to grant reasonable concessions for the construction of means of interoceanic communication, it was only because it was not imagined that such concessions would never be within such concessions would never be within the United States, in consideration of its the United States of legicates of sovereignty, should possess the right of free and open transit on any modes of communication that might be construct communication that might be constructed, the obvious intent of the treaty rendered it unnecessary, if not superfluous, in terms to stipulate that permission for the construction of such mides of communication should be denied.

munication should be denied.

Fixed Purpose.

Long before the conclusion of the HayHerran treaty the course of events had
shown that a canal to connect the Atlieute and Pacific oceans must be built
by the United States or not at all. Experience had demonstrated that private
enterprise was utterly inadequate for the
purpose; and a fixed policy, declared
by the United States on many memorable occasions, and supported by the
piactically unanimous voice of American opinion, had rendered it morally impressibn that the work should be undertaken by European powers, either singly
or in combination. Such were the universally recognized condition on which
the legislation of the Congress was based,
and on which the late negotiations with
Colombia were begun and concluded.
Nevertheless, when the well-considered
agreement was rejected by Colombia and
the revolution on the Isthmus ensued
one of Colombia's first acts was to invoice the intervention of the United
States; nor does her invitation appear
to have been confined to this government
alone. By a telegram from Mr. Beaupre,
our minister at Bogota, of the Th of
November last, we were informed that
General Revsis would soon leave Panama Fixed Purpose. dor, to continue from Bogota to The other in the Isthmus of Panama, is a conception that would in itself be incredible, even if the contrary did not clearly appear. It is true that since the treaty was made the United States has again and again been obliged forcibly to intervene for the proservation of refer and the main tenance of an open transit, and that this intervention has usually operated to the advantage of the titular government of Colombia, but it is equally true that the United States in intervening, with or without Colombia's conkent, for the protection of the travisit, has disclaimed any duty to defend the Colombia government against domestic insurrection or against the erection of an independent government on the Isthmus of Panama, The attacks against which the United States and sovereignty were those of foreign powers; but this engagement was only a means to the accomplishment of a yet more important end. The great design of the article was to assure the dedication to the United States at the sovernment should be reactively an accordance with article States on the second of the United States and sovereignty and transit of the States of States against which the United States against which the United States against which the United States and sovereignty and transit of the United States and sovereignty and transit of the United States and sovereignty in the day, this government was asked whicher it would take action "to maintain Colombian right and sovereignty and transit of the United States to intervent of the United States to the United States to the United States to intervent of the United States to the United States to the Uni

ernment has uniformly construed it, a new revolt against Colombia's authority brought about by her own refusa' to permit the fulfillment of the great design for which that trenty was made. It was under these circumstances that the United States, instead of using its forces to destroy those who sought to make the orangements of the treaty a reality, receptized them as the proper custodians of the sovereignty of the Ishmus.

This recognition was, in the second place, further justified by the highest considerations of our national interests and safety. In all the range of our international relations, I do not hesitate to affirm that there is nothing of greater or more pressing importance than the construction of an interocennic canal Long acknowledged to be essential to dure commercial development, it has become, as the result of the recent extension of our territorial dominion, more than ever essential to our national self-defense. In transmitting to the Senate the treaty of 1840, President Polk pointed out as the principal reason for its ratification that the passage of the Isthmus, which it was designed to secure, "would relieve us from a long and dangerous navigation of more than 9,000 miles around Capa Horn, and render our communication with our own possessions on the horthwest coast of America emparatively easy and speedy." The events of the past five years have given to this consideration an importance immeasurably greater than it possessed in 1840. In the 1840. five years have given to this considera-tion an importance immeasurably greater than it possessed in 1846. In the with of our present situation, the establish-ment of easy and speedy communication by sea, between the Atlantic and the Pacific presents itself not simply as semething to be desired, but as an object to be positively and promptly atlaned. Incasons of convenience have been super-seded by reasons of vital necessity, which do not admit of indefinite delays. To such delays the rejection by Co-

do not admit of Indefinite delays.

To such delays the rejection by Colombia of the Hay-Herran treaty directly exposed us. As proof of this fact, I need only refer to the programme outlined in the report of the majority of the Pranama canal committee, read in the Colombian Senate on the 14th of October last. In this report, which recommended that the discussion of a law to an thorize the government to enter upon new negotiations should be indefinitely pertponed, it is proposed that the consideration of the subject should be deferred till October 31, 1903, when the next Colombian Congress should have met in ordinary session. By that time, as the report goes on to say, the extension of time granted to the New Panama Canal Company by treaty in 1892 would have expired, and the new Congress would be in a position to take up the question whether the company had not, in spite of further extensions that had been granted by legislative acts, forfeited all its property and rights. "When that time arrives," the republic, without any impediment, will be abive to contract, and will be furnor clear, more definite, and more adventageous powession both legally and materially." The paked meaning of this report is that Colombia proposed to wait until, by the enforcement of a forfeiture repugnant to the lefeas of justice which obtain in ewry civilized mation, the property and rights of the New Panama Canal Company could be confiscated.

Such is the scheme to which it was proposed that the United States should be invited to become a party. The construction of the canal was to be relessed to the indefinite ruture, while Commitment of the form advantageous powered that the United States should be invited to be paid by the Judied States for the privilege of competing the canal, but also the forty millions authorized to the indefinite of the carry out this green would have brought Colombia, this government would have brought Colombia, this government so the forty millions authorized to the privilege of the treaty of 1848; and all this

Act Justified.

In the third place, I confidently main-tain that the recognition of the Republic

return nothing but our homorable pledge to build the canal and protect it as an open highway. It was in view of this pledge and of the proposed snactment by the Congress of the United States of legislation to give it immediate, effect that the second Pan-American Conference, at the city of Mexico, on January 22, 1902, adopted the following resolution:

The republics assembled at the International Conference of alexico applauded the purpose of the United States government to construct an interocanic carial, and knowledge that this work will not early to worthy of the greatness of the American people, but also in the pigness sense a work of civilization, and to the greatness of the American people, but also in the pigness sense a work of civilization, and to the greatness of the American people, but also in the pigness sense a work of civilization, and to the world.

Among those who signed this resolution on behalf of their respective governments was General Reyes, the delegate of Colombia. Little could it have been foreseen that two years later the Colombian Government, led astray by false allurements of selfish advantage, and forgetful alke of its international obligations and of the duties and responsibilities of sovereignty, would thwart the efforts of the United States to enter upon and complete a work which the nations of America, re-echoing the sentiment of the nations of Europe, had pronounced to be not only "worthy of the greatness of the American people" but also "in the highest sense a work of civilization."

That our position as the mandatary of all the sentiment of the sentiment of the matons of sense a work of civilization."

nounced to be not only "worthy of the greatness of the American people" but also "in the highest sense a work of civilization."

That our position as the mandatary of civilization has been by no means misseconceived is shown by the promptitude with which the powers have, one after another, followed our lead in recognizing Panama as an independent State. Our action in recognizing the new republic has been followed by like recognition on the part of France, Germany, Denmark, Russia, Swenden and Norway, Nicaragua, Peru, China, Cuba, Great Britain, Italy, Costa Rica, Japan and Austria-Hungary.

gua, Peru, Chang, Italy, Costa Rica, Japan and Hungary, of the manifold considerations in view of the manifold considerations in view of the manifold considerations. Hungary.

In view of the manifold considerations of treaty right and obligation, of national interest and safety and of collective civilization, by which our government was constrained to not, i am at a loss to comprehend the attitude of those who can discert in the recognition of the Republic of Panama only a general approval of the principle of "revolution," by which a given government is overturned or one portion of a country separated from another. Only the amplest justification can warrant a revolutionary movement of either kind. But there is

(Continued on Sixth Page) Y.C.